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Abstract
Despite the similarities between shame and guilt, there is a growing body of evidence that shame
and guilt are distinct emotional constructs. Guilt, despite its negative valence, is frequently
associated with approach motivation, whereas shame is associated with withdrawal motivation.
Research shows that engagement of the approach motivational system yields attenuation of the
defensive startle reflex, but that activation of the withdrawal motivation system augments the
startle reflex. Thus, approach-related guilt and withdrawal-related shame should attenuate and
augment the startle magnitude, respectively. To test this prediction, 68 participants imagined
scripts of four different affective conditions (i.e., shame, guilt, neutral, positive). Startle
response, heart rate (HR) activity, skin conductance (SC), and self-report affective data were
collected. Both shame and guilt scripts were rated as unpleasant and arousing but the shame
script was rated as more unpleasant than the guilt script. Contrary to prediction, no significant
difference in startle response magnitude between shame and guilt emerged. Startle response
magnitude of shame and guilt was significantly larger than neutral and positive. These findings
are discussed in the context of the startle response and the need for additional research that could
more directly address the question of approach versus avoidance motivation.

Exploring Distinct Aspects of Shame and Guilt:
Can Startle Reflex Modification Differentiate Shame from Guilt?

Sangmoon Kim
B.A., Chung-Ang University, the Republic of Korea, 2003
M.S., Syracuse University, 2007

Dissertation

Submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Clinical Psychology of the
Graduate School of Syracuse University
August 2012

Copyright © Sangmoon Kim August 2012
All Rights Reserved

Table of Contents
List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………………..vi
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………1
Shame and Guilt: Distinct Emotions……………………………………………………...3
Motivational Systems of Emotion………………………………………………………...5
Not All Unpleasant Emotions are Withdrawal-Related…………………………………..8
The Current Study: Shame, Guilt, and Startle Reflex Modification……………………..10
Method.………………………………………………………………………………………......12
Participants……………………………………………………………………………….12
Stimulus Materials...……………………………………………………………………..13
Design……………………………………………………………………………………15
Apparatus and Physiological Response Measurement..…………………………………16
Electromyographic (EMG) recording……………………………………………16
Skin conductance...………………………………………………………………17
Electrocardiogram (ECG)..………………………………………………………17
Procedure………………………………………………………………………………...18
Physiological Data Reduction……………………………………………………………21
Data Analysis.……………………………………………………………………………22
Results……………………………………………………………………………………………25
Physiological Reactivity Data…….……………………………………………………...25
Startle response magnitude (SRM)……………………………………………....25
Heart rate change (HRC)………………………………………………………...25
Skin conductance response (SCR)……………………………………………….26
iv

Self-Report Data…………………………………………………………………………26
Data obtained from the second imagery task…………………………………….26
Paper-and-pencil questionnaires data……………………………………………27
Supplementary Data Analysis: Explaining Variance in Physiological Data with SelfReported Data…...……………………………………………………………………….28
Discussion………………………………………………………………………………………..29
Limitations and Future Directions……………………………………………………….35
Summary and conclusion…………………………………………………………….......38
Appendix……………………………………………………………………………………........52
References………………………………………………………………………………………..68
Vita…………………………………………………………………………………………….....85

v

List of Tables
1.

Descriptive Statistics of TOSCA-3 Negative Scenarios…………………………………39

2.

Six Orders of Emotional Pairing utilized in the current study…………………………...40

3.

Multilevel Models Testing the Effect of Script Emotion Condition on Startle Response
Magnitude………………………………………………………………………………..41

4.

Multilevel Models Testing the Effect of Script Emotion Condition on Heart Rate Change
…………………………………………………………………………………………...42

5.

Multilevel Models Testing the Effect of Script Emotion Condition on Skin Conductance
Response…………………………………………………………………………………43

6.

Multilevel Models Testing the Effect of Script Emotion Condition on Valence Rating...44

7.

Multilevel Models Testing the Effect of Script Emotion Condition on Arousal Rating...45

8.

Multilevel Models Testing the Effect of Script Emotion Condition on Vividness Rating
……………………………………………………………………………………………46

9.

Multilevel Models Testing the Effect of Script Emotion Condition on Shame Rating….47

10.

Multilevel Models Testing the Effect of Script Emotion Condition on Guilt Rating……48

11.

Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlation Coefficients for Pencil-and-Paper
Questionnaire Measures………………………………………………………………….49

12.

Results of MLM to Test the Effects of Self-Reported Data of Second Imagery Session on
Physiological Reactivity…………………………………………………………………50

13.

Results of MLM to Test the Effects of Between-Individual Variables on SRM………...51

vi

1
Exploring Distinct Aspects of Shame and Guilt: Can Startle Reflex Modification Differentiate
Shame from Guilt?
Dimensional views of emotion assume that affective experiences vary with respect to a
small number of dimensions. Valence (i.e., pleasure-displeasure) and arousal have been
identified as the principal dimensions of emotion (Russell, 1979; Schlosberg, 1954; Watson,
Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999), among some others (e.g., dominance, potency, engagement;
see Osgood, 1969; Russell, 1978; Schlosberg, 1952). For example, Russell (1980) proposed that
affective words are categorized as a circumplex pattern with valence and arousal accounting for
about 70% of the total variance in affective experience. In addition, people categorize facial
expressions of others into different dimensions according to their own perceptions of valence and
arousal of the facial expressions (Abelson & Sermat, 1962). Even some “basic emotions”
theorists (e.g., Izard, 2007; Panksepp, 2007) agree that a dimensional view of emotion has some
merit. In fact, considering the two different approaches (i.e., dimensional and basic emotion
views) simultaneously may better describe and explain emotional experience (e.g., Diener,
Smith, & Fujita, 1995; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987). For example, from a
“basic emotions” point of view, fear and joy are discrete emotions due to different patterns of
physiological responses (e.g., heart rate, blood pressure, skin conductance) (e.g., Cook,
Melamed, Cuthbert, McNeil, & Lang, 1988); in addition to the distinctive patterns of
physiological responses, people also differentiate these two emotions from each other according
to each emotion’s relative position on the axes of valence and arousal (e.g., Russell, 1979). It is
noteworthy that in characterizing emotions physiological response and appraisal of dimensions
are often deployed (e.g., Vrana, 1994; Witvliet & Vrana, 1995). For example, unpleasant and
highly arousing emotions could be accompanied by different patterns of physiological responses
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compared to emotions characterized by displeasure and low arousal, pleasure and high arousal,
or pleasure and low arousal .(e.g., Cook, Hawk, Davis, & Stevenson, 1991; Miller, Patrick, &
Levenston, 2002). Therefore, if two emotions are positioned in the same dimensions of valence
and arousal, similar patterns of physiological responses between them could be expected. If so,
these two emotions could be classified into a similar category without discernible distinction in
terms of the underlying pattern of physiological responsivity.
Numerous affective studies have reported that shame and guilt, which involve heightened
self-consciousness (Tracy, Robins, & Tangney, 2005), are equally unpleasant and arousing (e.g.,
Frijda, Kuipers, & Schure, 1989; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). In addition, shame and guilt
are often experienced simultaneously (e.g., Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2007). Shame
and guilt are also similar in that no distinctive pattern of facial expression characterizes either
(Ekman & Friesen, 1975). Partly due to these similarities, guilt is often used as a generic term for
both guilt and shame. Furthermore, because they are equally unpleasant and arousing, no
idiosyncratic physiological response patterns should be uncovered, especially in terms of
autonomic responses (e.g., HR, SC), which could challenge a perspective holding that shame and
guilt are distinct emotions. However, there is growing evidence that shame and guilt are distinct
emotional constructs. For example, shame and guilt are associated with different appraisal
patterns (e.g., Brown & Weiner, 1984; Covington & Omelich, 1984; Jagacinski & Nicolls, 1984;
Weiner, 1985). Shame and guilt also diverge in their associations with self-reported depressive
symptoms (e.g., Tangney, 1995; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992; see Kim, Thibodeau, &
Jorgensen, 2011 for further discussion). The approach versus withdrawal motivational
underpinnings of shame and guilt are also thought to be different. Indeed, Lewis (1971) outlined
a theoretical framework in which shame is linked to withdrawal-related behavioral patterns and
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guilt is linked to approach-related behavioral patterns. The current study aims to test this
theoretical framework by using a tool (i.e., the startle probe) sensitive to motivational direction
(viz., approach versus avoidance) to explore the motivational basis of shame and guilt.
Shame and Guilt: Distinct Emotions
Despite some similarities between shame and guilt mentioned above, two different
theoretical frameworks suggest that shame and guilt should be distinct with respect to
motivational direction and other dimensions. According to Lewis (1971), the focus of blame is
different in shame versus guilt; shame is about the global self (e.g., I am bad), whereas guilt is
about specific thing done (e.g., I did bad thing). The whole self (i.e., broadly defined as “selfperception”; see Watson, 2004) is devalued with shame, whereas the offensive action is
criticized with guilt. Accordingly, shamed individuals wish they could change qualities of the
self to dissipate the feelings of shame (Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994). Lewis further
reasoned that due to the different levels of task difficulty dissipating shame and guilt,
withdrawal-oriented (e.g., escape from disapproval) and approach-oriented (e.g., repairing
wrongdoings) behavioral patterns would be prompted by shame and guilt, respectively. Since it
should be challenging to transform the devalued whole self, a greater urge to hide or escape
could be easily understood as an essential part of the shame experience. In contrast, focusing on
and blaming a specific action done, a guilty individual would be more motivated to make amends
to diminish the feelings of guilt, action that is consistent with approach motivation.
In addition, an evolutionary framework also argues for heightened submissiveness (i.e.,
increased withdrawal motivation) in shame (Gilbert, 1997, 2003). From an evolutionary point of
view, “shame serves to alert the self and others to detrimental changes in social status” (Gilbert,
1997, p. 114). Therefore, one’s relative social status (i.e., inferiority versus superiority) is a key
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determinant of the shame experience, and shame corresponds to the sense of inferiority. Gilbert
proposed that submissive behavioral patterns such as hiding, escaping and avoiding eye gaze are
prompted by shame because these behaviors clearly signal one’s defeat or inferior status to
prevent further attacks from a dominant.
The above two theoretical frameworks suggest links between shame and withdrawal
behavioral tendencies on the one hand and guilt and approach behavioral tendencies on the other.
In fact, numerous studies largely based on self-report data support the proposed links (e.g.,
Barrett, Zahn-Waxler, & Cole, 1993; Donatelli, Bybee, & Buka, 2007; Frijda et al., 1989;
McGraw, 1987; Roseman et al., 1994; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; Zeelenberg &
Breugelmans, 2008). For example, people express a greater tendency to feel inferiority and
passivity, accompanied by increased desire to hide, in shame compared to guilt (Wicker, Payne,
& Morgan, 1983). In contrast, a greater desire to confess one’s wrongdoings and make amends is
associated with guilt (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984), which positively contributes to the quality of
interpersonal relationships (see Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). Considering that
maintaining satisfying interpersonal relationships is a critical goal (Baumesiter & Leary, 1995),
people would be fundamentally motivated to actively seek possible ways of “setting things right”
rather than hiding or escaping. In addition, empathy that motivates approach-oriented behaviors
(e.g., wanting to help someone in trouble; Harmon-Jones, Peterson & Vaughn, 2003) is
positively correlated with guilt (e.g., Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney, 1991).
The theoretical frameworks and the empirical data described above are consistent with
the notion that shame and guilt are distinct emotional constructs. They appear especially distinct
in terms of motivational direction: shame corresponds to withdrawal motivation whereas guilt
corresponds to approach motivation. It is worth noting that affective science historically
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proposes motivational systems (e.g., approach or withdrawal) as a valid dimension of emotion
(see Lang, 1994) in addition to the valence and arousal (e.g., Russell, 1979). In other words,
emotions can be differentiated from each other according to their respective motivational state
even though they are in the same dimensions of valence and arousal, which supports the
proposed distinction between shame and guilt. The purpose of proceeding section is to review
the proposition of motivational systems of emotion.
Motivational Systems of Emotion
In addition to the nature of emotion (i.e., what is emotion?), the function of emotion (i.e.,
what does emotion do?) has been a central theme of affective science (see Nesse & Ellsworth,
2009 for a review). It is now widely accepted that emotions are differentiated corresponding to
the functions they serve (e.g., Graham, 1988; Watson et al., 1999). In this functional approach,
emotions are adaptive and advantageous because they promote fitness or survival by motivating
action appropriate to address the situation (Leeper, 1948). For example, in situations involving
threat, fear motivates escape behavior (Roseman et al., 1994). There exists a linkage between
emotion and behavior, more precisely “action readiness,” and this linkage is attributed to the
motivational nature of emotion (Frijda, 1986). Therefore, in addition to the parameters of valence
and arousal, motivational factors also organize emotional experience (Lang, 1994). For example,
fear and jealousy are both appraised as unpleasant, but, unlike jealousy, fear is accompanied by a
heightened desire to withdraw (Frijda et al., 1989). Since motivation concerns the direction of
behavior (Brehm & Self, 1989), the vast array of motivated behavior can be classified as either
approach-oriented (i.e., seeking incentives or rewards) or withdrawal-oriented (i.e., avoiding
danger or punishment) (Schneirla, 1959). Therefore, shame and guilt could be categorized as
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reflecting approach and withdrawal motivation because withdrawal (e.g., hiding) and approach
(e.g., making amends) behaviors are prompted by shame and guilt, respectively.
However, it should be noted that traditional views of the relationship between emotion
and approach/withdrawal motivation hold that pleasant emotion is associated with approach
motivation whereas unpleasant emotion like shame and guilt is associated with withdrawal
motivation. Several diverse lines of research converge on this view. Chen and Bargh (2009)
found that approach (e.g., pulling a lever inward) responses are more rapidly prompted by
positive compared to negative valence stimuli, but that avoidance (e.g., pushing a lever outward)
responses are more rapidly prompted by negative compared to positive valence. Roseman and his
colleagues (1994) reported that withdrawal behavioral tendencies (e.g., feeling like running away
or moving away from something) are often activated by fear, frustration, and disgust, which are
prototypical unpleasant emotions. In contrast, approach behavioral tendencies (e.g., obtaining
reward) are primed by classic pleasant emotions such as joy and pride (Roseman, Spindel, &
Jose, 1990). Furthermore, pleasant emotion broadens the span of attention and action, which
encourages approach-oriented behaviors (e.g., active goal seeking; Fredrickson, 1998;
Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Fredrickson & Losada, 2005).
Some neurophysiological research is also instructive. First, electroencephalographic
(EEG) studies of motivation show that the left and right frontal cortices mediate approach and
withdrawal motivation, respectively (Fox et al., 1995; Kinsbourne, 1988; Silberman &
Weingartner, 1986; Sutton & Davidson, 1997; see Davidson, 1998 for a review). For example,
Harmon-Jones and Allen (1997) reported that greater left frontal cortical activity is associated
with approach-related dispositional tendencies. There is also empirical evidence to support an
association between EEG asymmetry and the valence of emotion (e.g., Buss, Schumacher,
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Dolski, Kalin, Goldsmith, & Davidson, 2003; Davidson & Fox, 1989; Fox et al., 1995; Kalin,
Larson, Shelton, & Davidson, 1998; Kang, Davidson, Coe, Wheeler, Tomarken, & Ershler,
1991; Tomarken, Davidson, & Henriques, 1990). For example, Tomarken, Davidson, Wheeler
and Doss (1992) reported that individuals with relatively greater left frontal activation tend to
experience increased generalized pleasant emotion but decreased unpleasant emotion compared
with individuals with greater right frontal activation. Facial expressions of fear, disgust, or
sadness result in relatively larger right frontal activation, whereas facial expression of joy
generates relatively greater left frontal activation (Coan, Allen, & Harmon-Jones, 2001). In
addition, simple right hand contraction that generates increased left frontal cortex activity results
in an increased level of pleasant emotions (Harmon-Jones, 2006).
Second, startle reflex research provides additional evidence of the associations between
emotional valence and motivational direction. The startle reflex is a defensive reflex that is
elicited in response to a sudden, unexpected stimulus (Dawson, Schell, & Bohmelt, 1999). The
magnitude of the startle reflex is facilitated during withdrawal motivational states and inhibited
during approach motivational states (Drobes, Miller, Hillman, Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001;
see Lang, Bardley, & Cuthbert, 1998 for a review). The effects of emotional states on startle
modification have been widely examined (see Lang, 1995 for a review). Unpleasant emotion
facilitates the startle reflex whereas pleasant emotion inhibits the reflex (e.g., Jackson,
Malmstadt, Larson, & Davidson, 2000; Yartz & Hawk, 2002; see Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang,
1999 for a review). For example, Vrana, Spence, and Lang (1988) reported that participants’
startle reflex magnitudes were largest during vewing unpleasant pictures and smallest during
viewing of pleasant pictures. The same patterns of affective startle modification have been found
in studies using emotional imagery tasks (e.g., Cook et al., 1991; Vrana, 1994). For example, the
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magnitude of startle reflex is larger while participants imagine fearful scripts versus neutral
scripts (Vrana & Lang, 1990).
In sum, pleasant and unpleasant emotions seem to motivate approach and withdrawal
behaviors, respectively, which challenges the proposition that shame and guilt are motivationally
distinct. However, recent research has begun to illuminate instances in which this general pattern
does not hold. Is it possible that pleasant emotion is sometimes associated with withdrawal
motivation, or that unpleasant emotion is sometimes associated with approach motivation?
Not All Unpleasant Emotions are Withdrawal-Related
As illustrated before, the vast array of motivated behaviors can be simply categorized
reflecting as either approach or withdrawal (e.g., Schneirla, 1959). Two different biobehavioral
systems have been proposed to mediate the wide range of motivated behaviors; one
corresponding to approach (i.e., approach system), the other corresponding to withdrawal (i.e.,
withdrawal system) (e.g., Barrett & Russell, 1998; Carver, Sutton, & Scheier, 2000; Lang,
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990; Rosenberg, 1998; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Simply stated,
approach system prompts approach behaviors (e.g., looking for food and mating partners),
whereas withdrawal activation system stimulates withdrawal behaviors (e.g., escaping from
danger). Because pleasant and unpleasant emotions in general are associated with approach and
withdrawal behaviors, respectively (e.g., Fischer, Shaver, & Carnochan, 1990), it has been also
proposed that two different types of activation system are uniquely intertwined with the valence
of emotion (e.g., Lang et al., 1990; Watson et al., 1999). In other words, when approach system
is activated motivating approach behaviors, pleasant emotion is exclusively accompanied,
whereas unpleasant emotion is accompanied by the activation of withdrawal system.
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However, the exclusive associations of pleasant emotion with approach on the one hand,
and unpleasant emotion with withdrawal on the other hand have been challenged (e.g., Carver,
2001, 2003; Harmon-Jones, 2003; Roseman, 1991). Anger, sadness, and frustration, classic
unpleasant emotions, have been found to be associated with approach motivation in some
instances (e.g., Carver, 2004; Harmon-Jones, 2003; Roseman et al., 1990). In addition, anger
often facilitates approach-oriented behavioral patterns (Crossman, Sullivan, Hitchcock, & Lewis,
2009) as well as increased left frontal cortex activity (Harmon-Jones, Abramson, Sigelman,
Bohlig, Hogan, & Harmon-Jones, 2002; Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998; Harmon-Jones &
Sigelman, 2001; Harmon-Jones, Vaughn-Scott, Mohr, Sigelman, & Harmon-Jones, 2004). These
data suggest that anger, an unpleasant emotion, is frequently associated with approach, not
withdrawal, motivation. A plausible explanation of the link between anger and approach
motivation is that anger is often provoked by goal blockage that might best be addressed through
approach-oriented action. Levine (1995) reported that when encountering undesirable situations
(e.g., goal attainment is impeded), children express anger when they believe they could reinstate
the goals but sadness is expressed when reinstating the goals is perceived as impossible. In a
similar vein, the link between anger and increased left frontal cortex activity is more discernible
when individuals perceive that goal attainment is plausible (Harmon-Jones, Lueck, Fearn, &
Harmon-Jones, 2006; Harmon-Jones, Sigelman, Bohlig, & Harmon-Jones, 2003), which seems
to imply a positive linear relationship between a sense of controllability and the intensity of
approach motivation (i.e., the more controllability, the stronger appetitive motivation) (Brehm &
Self, 1989). It is worth noting that individuals perceive guilt-inducing situations as more
controllable or modifiable (Frijda et al., 1989; Graham, 1988; Roseman et al., 1994) compared to
shame-inducing ones. Therefore, it is conceivable that the intensity of approach motivation (e.g.,
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making amends) would be greater with guilt than shame because of the greater sense of
controllability with guilt.
In sum, valence and motivational direction should be understood as partially separable
dimensions of emotional experience. Dissociation between valence and motivational direction
seems more prominent among unpleasant emotions compared to pleasant emotions (e.g., Watson
et al., 1999). That is one context that elicits unpleasant emotions may call forth approach
motivation and action to change the situation, whereas another may call forth withdrawal
motivation and action to escape the source of distress. Consistent with this view, guilt appears to
be associated with approach motivation, whereas shame appears to be associated with
withdrawal motivation.
The Current Study: Shame, Guilt, and Startle Reflex Modification
The startle probe is a tool that appears uniquely capable of evaluating the motivational
underpinnings of shame and guilt. The startle reflex is facilitated when an organism is in
withdrawal motivational state but inhibited when an organism is in approach motivational state
(Lang et al., 1998). Thus, the startle paradigm permits evaluation of the motivational
underpinnings of emotional states such as shame and guilt. Previous literature on this issue
provides some evidence that shame and guilt could give rise to withdrawal and approach
motives, respectively. However, this conclusion is largely based upon self-report data, which
represents a critical limitation of the previous findings. Therefore, the current study aims to
extend previous findings by exploring the effects of shame and guilt on startle reflex magnitude.
The importance of utilization of multiple measures tapping into several domains (e.g., selfreported affective experience data, physiological data) comprising the “data of emotion” has
been well documented (e.g., Lang, 1968, 1977 & 1979). Studies using shame and guilt measures
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reflecting H. Lewis’s theoretical framework (e.g., Test of Self-Conscious Affect; Tangney,
Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow, 2000) have repeatedly reported that shame but not guilt is
positively associated with depressive symptoms, and the different motivational underpinnings of
shame and guilt were hypothesized as a possible mechanism for these findings (see Kim et al.,
2011 for a review). Therefore, the current study would offer an explanation of a heightened
association of shame but not guilt with depressive symptoms. In addition, the current study
would inform more effective ways of constructing messages to promote healthy behaviors;
approach-associated guilt-inducing messages would be more effective to motivate individuals to
engage in healthy behaviors.
To explore the differences in the magnitude of startle reflex between shame and guilt,
imagery tasks were implemented in the current study. Participants imagined several scripts
depicting different emotional antecedents as well as target emotion-relevant thoughts, behaviors,
and feelings. Four different emotional states were manipulated: shame, guilt, neutral (i.e.,
pleasant and low arousal), and positive (i.e., pleasant and high arousal). While participants were
engaged in the imagery task, eyeblink startle, HR and SC were collected online. Participants’
self-reported affective experience of the scripts was assessed subsequent to physiological data
collection. With respect to self-reported affective experience, it was expected that (a) shame and
guilt would be appraised as inducing similar levels of unpleasantness and arousal; (b) shamerelevant momentary feelings would be stronger in the shame script condition than in the three
other conditions; and (c) guilt-relevant momentary feelings would be stronger in the guilt script
condition than in the three other conditions. With respect to startle reflex modification, it was
hypothesized that (a) the magnitude of startle reflex would be largest while imagining the shame
script followed by neutral, guilt, and positive scripts. Psychophysiological studies using imagery
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tasks repeatedly report positive linear relationships of self-reported arousal with skin
conductance and heart rate (e.g., Cook et al., 1988; McNeil, Vrana, Melamed, Cuthbert, & Lang,
1993; Miller et al., 2002; Patrick, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1994; Vrana, 1994; Vrana, Cuthbert, &
Lang, 1989; Vrana & Lang, 1990; Witvliet & Vrana, 2000). Therefore, in terms of skin
conductance and heart rate, it is expected that there would be no significant difference among
shame, guilt, and positive scripts because they would be appraised as equally arousing. However,
it was hypothesized that the magnitudes of heart rate and skin conductance under these emotional
conditions would be larger than neutral script condition. Of note, documented similarities (e.g.,
unpleasant and arousing) between shame and guilt have been primarily base upon self-reported
measures without incorporating physiological data (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman et al.,
1994). Inclusion of heart rate and skin conductance was thought to advance our understanding of
the similar characteristics shared by shame and guilt.
Method
Participants
Seventy-four participants from a large northeastern university participated in the study in
exchange for credit in an introductory psychology course. Participation of six participants was
early terminated in the middle of the first of two imagery sessions due to self-reported fatigue.
Consequently, sixty-eight participants (37 female, 40 White, mean age = 19.87, SD = 5.11)
completed the whole experimental tasks.
Physiological data from 17 participants were excluded because of instrumentation
problems; data were either not properly saved (n = 6) or contaminated with excessive noise (n =
11). Therefore, physiological data analyses are based on n = 51 participants. Participants
excluded did not differ from their counterparts with respect to age, t(66) = –1.45, p = .15, gender,
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χ2(1, n = 68) = 2.39, p = .12, or ethnicity χ2(4, n = 68) = 1.92, p = .75.
Stimulus Materials
Twelve sentence-length scripts that described three situations for each emotion condition
(i.e., shame, guilt, neutral, and positive) were used as the emotional stimuli (see Appendix A).
First, construction of the emotional stimuli for shame and guilt were partly informed by
another independent study conducted in our laboratory. For this study, 199 college students
completed the Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 (TOSCA-3; Tangney et al., 2000) (see Appendix
B). The TOSCA measures cognitive, affective, and behavioral aspects of shame, guilt, and three
other constructs (e.g., externalization of blame). The constructs of shame and guilt were largely
adopted from Lewis’s (1971) conceptualization of shame as reflecting negative aspects of self
(e.g., being worthless, powerless) and guilt reflecting concerns about specific actions (e.g.,
feeling regret, wanting to repair). The TOSCA consists of 16 hypothetical situations (11 negative
and 5 positive scenarios) (e.g., “You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At 5 o’clock, you
realize you stood your friend up”) which were drawn from written accounts of personal shame,
guilt, and pride experiences provided by several hundred college students and noncollege adults.
Each scenario is followed by separate response choices reflecting shame (e.g., “You would think:
“I’m inconsiderate””), guilt (e.g., “You’d think you should make it up to your friend as soon as
possible”), and other constructs. Cronbach’s alpha for shame and guilt were 0.76 and 0.66,
respectively (Luyten, Fontaine, & Corveleyn, 2002). The TOSCA tends to yield somewhat low
Cronbach’s alpha because each item introduces additional variance associated with its own
scenario (i.e., scenario approach introduces the situation variance) (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).
In addition, guilt items on the TOSCA reflect concerns about specific actions, which may be an
additional source of heterogeneity among these items, whereas shame items on the TOSCA
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reflect more stable self-perception. That is, use of more contextually bound information for the
guilt items may be one reason for the lower Cronbach’s alphas observed for guilt items than for
shame items, which have more of a general self-perception basis.
Table 1 reported descriptive statistics of shame and guilt scores of TOSCA for each of
the 11 negative scenarios. Shame and guilt are often experienced simultaneously in the same
situation (Gilbert & Miles, 2000; Harder & Zalma, 1990; Higgins, 1987). Scenarios were rankordered based upon shame and guilt score, respectively. To minimize a chance of “emotional
blending,” situations that were highly ranked for both shame and guilt (e.g., scenario1) were
excluded from the final pool of emotional stimuli. Scenario 15 and 4 were selected as shame
scripts; they were ranked as second and third on shame score but these scenarios were ranked
relatively lower on guilt score. Scenario 7, 10 and 13 were selected as guilt scripts based upon
the same rationale. Selected scripts (i.e., two for shame, three for guilt; succeeding section
described a development of third shame script) for the current study were slightly modified from
the original format of the TOSCA (e.g., “At work, you wait until the last minute to plan a
project, and it turns out badly. You would feel incompetent.” was changed to “One of my classes
requires a 10-page essay that is a really high-stakes paper. It turns out really badly, and I feel like
I am stupid and incompetent.”) (see Appendix A). To maximize participants’ experiencing
“pure” target emotions, each emotional script illustrated both a hypothetical situation and shameor guilt-relevant response.
The constructs of shame measured by the TOSCA seem to less clearly tap into Gilbert’s
evolutionary perspective in which shame results from the awareness of defeat or lowered social
status. Gilbert (1997) proposed that human beings have innate needs to be seen as attractive to
others, and social status is largely determined by this social attractiveness. By being less
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attractive, an individual may take a lower social position and become more vulnerable to shame.
Since physical appearance could play an important role to determine social attractiveness,
negative evaluations about one’s body made by either the self or others provoke feelings of
shame (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997; Fredrickson, Roberts, Noll, Quinn, & Twenge, 1998;
McKinley & Hyde, 1996; Noll & Fredrickson, 1998; Slater & Tiggemann, 2002; Tiggemann &
Slater, 2001). Consequently, the third shame script was created by the experimenter to reflect
this evolutionary framework. Of importance, receiving social rejection or disapproval has been
conceptualized as shame-relevant and, consequently, is integrated in this script (cf. Higgins,
1987; Lewis, 1971).
The stimuli for neutral and positive emotional conditions were obtained from previous
research on emotional imagery (e.g., Cook et al., 1988; Miller, Levin, Kozak, Cook, McLean, &
Lang, 1987; Witvliet & Vrana, 1995, 2000). Witvliet and Vrana (1995) described that a sample
of 55 undergraduates rated 70 affective sentences using 7-point Likert-type scales in terms of
valence, arousal, dominance, and a few discrete emotional states (e.g., joy, pleasant relaxation).
Witvliet and Vrana reported that affective sentences for joy and pleasant relaxation (i.e., neutral)
were selected based upon participants’ endorsement of pleasantness, arousal, and
representativeness of the specific emotion category. Joy sentences were appraised as positive and
highly arousing, whereas pleasant relaxation as positive and less arousing. Other researchers
(e.g., Cook et al., 1988) reported almost identical affective ratings for the same neutral scripts.
Of note, scripts depicting pleasant relaxation were labeled as neutral scripts in previous imagery
studies (e.g., Cook et al., 1988; Miller et al., 1987).
Design
In the current study, participants imagined a pair of emotional scripts that they were cued
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to imagine for 8 seconds by letter presentation (either ‘A’ or ‘B’) (as described in detail in the
Procedure section later). Similar procedures were implemented by previous startle modification
studies using imagery (e.g., Witvliet & Vrana, 1995, 2000). Eight-second imagery trial was
terminated when the word ‘relaxation’ appeared on the computer screen, when participants
returned to relaxation. The duration of relaxation period was between 24 – 40 seconds. Each pair
of scripts consisted of two different emotional conditions, and therefore six pairings were made
total (i.e., shame-guilt, shame-neutral, shame-positive, guilt-neutral, guilt-positive, neutralpositive). Participants imagined each script four times in one block, and therefore eight imagery
trials consisted of one block. Six such blocks occurred in each experiment session, where
participants imagined all twelve different emotional scripts. Within each block, the startle probes
(i.e., a 50-ms burst of 95 dB white noise) were presented in the latter imagery trials (i.e., equally
often at 5, 6, or 7 seconds following imagery cue onset) in three out of the four trials of each
emotional condition. Two startle probes were presented within the relaxation periods to increase
the participants’ unpredictability of the occurrence of the startle stimuli. Participants were
instructed to ignore these noises.
Apparatus and Physiological Response Measurement
Stimulus control and data acquisition were accomplished using a Dell OptiPlex GX1
computer running LabVIEW vi. software (National Instruments Corporation, Austin, TX). The
startle stimulus was a 50-ms burst of 95 dB white noise with instantaneous rise time presented
binaurally through Telephonics TDH-50 headphones.
Electromyographic (EMG) recording. The startle response is often measured via the
eyeblink reflex in human startle research, and facial EMG is a generally preferred method to
assess eyeblink reflex. The current study followed the guidelines (e.g., skin preparation, startle
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elicitation) for EMG study offered by Blumenthal, Cuthbert, Filion, Hackley, Lipp, and Boxtel
(2005). Activity in the orbicularis oculi facial muscles was recorded using 4-mm Ag/AgCl
electrodes (Coulbourn Instruments, Allentown, PA) filled with electrolyte gel. One electrode was
placed below the lower left eyelid in the line with the pupil in forward gaze, and a second
electrode was placed approximately 1-2 cm lateral to the first one. Raw EMG signals were
amplified with separate Coulbourn V75-04 isolated bioamplifiers; frequencies below 90 Hz and
above 1000 Hz were filtered. The EMG analogue output was digitized by a PMD-16608FS A/D
Converter. All signals were sampled at 1000 Hz and integrated offline by the LabView software.
Skin conductance. Skin conductance measures were gathered by a Coulbourn V71-23
isolated skin conductance coupler using a constant voltage of 0.5 V. The coupler was calibrated
prior to each experimental session to detect activity in 0–40 μS range. Two standard 8-mm
Ag/AgCl electrodes filled with 0.05-m NaCl Unibase paste were placed on the hypothenar
eminence of the nondominant hand. The skin conductance was sampled at 10 Hz with a 12-bit
analog-digital converter.
Electrocardiogram (ECG). Heart rate activity was recorded from standard 8-mm
Ag/AgCl electrodes filled with electrolyte gel and positioned on the left and right inner forearms.
The ECG signal was acquired by a Coulbourn V75-11 isolated ECG amplifier/coupler. The
signal was filtered with high and low filter settings of 8 and 40 Hz. The ECG output was routed
to a PMD-16608FS analog-to-digital converter and a custom built R-wave detector, with a digital
pulse output whose leading edge (0 to 5 V transition), corresponded to the R-wave peak in the
ECG waveform. At 2000 samples/second, the digitized output of the R-wave detector maintained
a 1-millisecond time resolution, which served as a trigger to measure interbeat intervals to the
nearest millisecond.
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Procedure
Upon arrival to the laboratory, participants first provided informed consent. They then
were seated in a chair facing a 17-inch computer screen (2.5 feet away). Upon completion of
electrode application, a brief description of the purpose of the study was provided. They were
told that the purpose of the study was to explore various people’s reactions to social situations
encountered in life. Then, the experimenter presented to participants a pair of two index cards
with typed scripts illustrating different emotional situations. Additional index cards with letter
either ‘A’ or ‘B’ covered the script cards. Participants were instructed to read each script and
create vivid imagery of the event described. Once participants reported having created vivid
imagery for each script, they were instructed to imagine the situation in one of the scripts every
time the letter ‘A’ presented on the computer screen, and to imagine the situation of the other
script every time the letter ‘B’ presented on the screen. In addition, they were instructed to relax
and think the word ‘one’ with each exhalation when the word ‘relaxation’ was shown on the
screen. The same relaxation instruction was used in the previous imagery studies and shown to
reduce tonic physiological reactivity (e.g., Cuthbert, Kristeller, Simons, Hodes, & Lang, 1981;
Vrana, 1994). They were also told that a burst of white noise would be occasionally delivered
over the headphones throughout imagery session. They were instructed to ignore these noises.
Then, the experimenter summarized the main points of the instructions, dimmed the lights, and
exited the room.
Upon the completion of the first imagery block, the experimenter returned with the next
pair of scripts of the two emotional conditions not imagined in block 1, and the same procedure
described above was implemented. This procedure was repeated for a total of six blocks. Six
orders of emotion pairings across experiment blocks were used (see Table 2). In addition, the
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same order of emotion pairings used for the preceding participant was used for a following
participant with reversed letter pairing so that each type of script was imagined with letter ‘A’
and ‘B’ equally often. The order of scripts representing each emotional condition was
randomized within participants. Upon completion of all imagery sessions, participants completed
a brief post-experimental questionnaire (see Appendix C) which served as a manipulation check.
Participants indicated that they carefully followed the imagery (mean = 7.53, SD = 1.04) and
relaxation (mean = 6.97, SD = 1.61) instructions given in the study. Participants reported that
following imagery instruction (mean = 5.27, SD = 2.06) and vividly imaging the situations
(mean = 5.22, SD = 2.12) were both moderate in difficulty. Similarly, following relaxation
instruction (mean = 4.42, SD = 2.26) and relaxing during relaxation period (mean = 4.53, SD =
2.18) were of moderate in difficulty.
Upon completion of the manipulation check, physiological recording sensors were
removed. The experimenter then informed the participant that they would imagine scripts for a
second time for purposes of self-report emotion ratings. Twelve scripts were randomized within
participants and PowerPoint slide shows were used for this second imagery session. Following
24-second relaxation period, a written script was displayed for 4 seconds and a blank slide was
then displayed for 8 seconds during which participants were instructed to imagine the script.
Participants then completed pencil-and-paper questionnaires to rate their imagery experience of
the script on affective dimensions of pleasantness and arousal in addition to the vividness of each
imagery scene (see Appendix D). They also completed the Personal Feelings Questionnaire-2
(PFQ-2; Harder & Zalma, 1990) (see Appendix E) to report their momentary shame- and guiltrelevant feelings for each emotional script. The PFQ is an adjective checklist assessing shame
with 10 items (e.g., embarrassment, feeling ridiculous, feelings of blushing) and guilt with 6
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items (e.g., worry about hurting or injuring someone, intense guilt, regret). Cronbach’s alpha for
shame and guilt were 0.78 and 0.72, respectively (Harder & Zalma, 1990). Since the PFQ taps
into trait-shame and guilt, the question format was modified from “how common the feeling is
for you” to “how much of each emotion you felt while imagining the script” to assess
participants’ affective experience during the imagery trials. Participants responded on a 5-point
scale ranging from ‘never’ (0) to ‘very strongly’ (4). The order of these questionnaires was
counterbalanced across imagery trials. This procedure was repeated for a total of twelve scripts.
In the current study, Cronbach’s alphas of the PFQ-Shame subscale ranged from .89 to .53
(average Cronbach’s alpha = .81); Cronbach’s alphas ofthe PFQ-Guilt subscale ranged from .89
to .04 (average Cronbach’s alpha = .73). PFQ scores with unsatisfactory Cronbach’s alpha (α <
.70) (i.e., shame score of Neutral 1 script, guilt scores of Neutral 3 and Positive 3 scripts) were
treated as missing data in the data analysis. These inconsistent alphas suggest that this revised
PFQ might have not appropriately assessed momentary shame and guilt feelings in the lab
context. In addition, the inconsistent within-subscale response was deemed to contribute to the
low Cronbach’s alphas obtained in the current study. For example, a close inspection of
participants’ responses on PFQ guilt items revealed that they only endorsed the item “mild guilt”
without endorsing other guilt items after they imagined Neutral 3 and Positive 3 scripts.
Upon completion of the second imagery session, participants completed the Center for
Epidemiological Studies – Depression scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977; see Appendix F), Test of
Self-Conscious Affect-3 (TOSCA-3; Tangney et al., 2000; see Appendix B) and Behavioral
Inhibition System (BIS) and Behavioral Activation System (BAS) Scales (BIS/BAS; Carver &
White, 1994; see Appendix G). The CES-D is a 20-item self-report inventory designed to
measure depressive symptomatology in the general population. Respondents rated how often
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they had experienced depression-related symptoms within the past week using a 4-point scale.
The BIS/BAS scales consist of 20 items (7 items for BIS and 13 items for BAS) measuring
individuals’ sensitivity to either cues of threat/punishment or cues of reward. Higher scores on
BIS indicate that responses of inhibition or avoidance are highly activated by the cues of threat,
whereas higher scores on BAS indicate that approach behavior is activated by the cues of reward.
Participants responded to each item based on a 4-point scale (from 1, disagree strongly to 4,
agree strongly). These supplementary questionnaires were included for exploratory data analysis
to: 1) replicate findings of previous empirical studies reporting significant positive correlations
between TOSCA shame and depressive symptoms, 2) investigate proposed withdrawal-related
shame and approach-related guilt using self-report measures (i.e., positive correlation between
TOSCA shame and BIS and between TOSCA guilt and BAS), and 3) investigate interaction
effects between script conditions and these measures of individual differences. Participants were
then debriefed and thanked for their participation in the study (see Appendix H for the
experimental instruction and Appendix I for the debriefing statement). There were no significant
group differences (n = 51 vs. n = 17 who were excluded from physiological data analysis) in
these self-report measures; CES-D, t(66) = –.02, p = .98; BIS, t(66) = –.21, p = .84; BAS, t(66) =
1.58, p = .12; TOSCA-Shame, t(66) = –1.27, p = .21; TOSCA-Guilt, t(66) = –.95, p = .35.
Physiological Data Reduction
Quantification of the startle blink EMG response followed the guidelines offered by
Bluementhal and his associates (2005). First, EMG data were edited for noise such as excessive
movement, with contaminated trials being rejected from analysis. Being blind to the emotional
condition with which blinks were associated, the author and a second rater independently
screened these rejected imagery trials. Out of total 1836 trials (51 x 36), inter-raters’ agreement
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(i.e., whether or not to reject a trial) rate was 94%, and all disagreements were discussed and
resolved by consensus. Consequently, 262 trials were rejected from 1836 trials (i.e., 14%
rejection rate). Of note, due to some equipment errors, the startle blink measures were not
recorded in 110 out of 262 trials, which were also counted as rejected trials. Adjusted rejection
rate was then about 9% (162 out of 1736), which was comparable to another independent
eyeblink startle study conducted in our laboratory (Thibodeau, 2009).
For each scorable imagery trial, the EMG baseline period was defined as the 50 ms
immediately prior to delivery of the white noise probe. The peak EMG amplitude was
determined in a window ranging from 20 ms to 200 ms after delivery of the white noise probe.
Data reduction was executed by TrialViewer3 software (SenSyr, 2010). Startle response
amplitude was computed by subtracting the EMG value at baseline from the peak. Startle
magnitude, a dependent measure of data analysis, was expressed as the ratio of the response
amplitude to EMG baseline value.
Skin conductance response (SCR) was computed by subtracting the average SC in a
window of 1 second immediately prior to the imagery cue (i.e., letter A or B) onset from the
peak in a window of 5 seconds following imagery cue onset. A log transformation (log [SCR +
1]) was used to normalize the data, following standard procedures. Heart rate (HR) change was
computed by subtracting the average HR in the 1 second prior to the imagery cue onset from the
average HR during 8 seconds of imagery trial. SCR and HR data reduction was also executed by
TrialViewer3 software (Sensyr, 2010). Due to some equipment errors, SCR and HR measures
were not recorded in 329 and 110 out of total 2448 trials (48 x 51), respectively. Trials without
physiological data were treated as missing data.
Data Analysis
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The dependent measures included physiological reactivity (i.e., startle magnitude, HR
and SCR), PFQ shame and guilt, and imagery ratings (i.e., valence, arousal, and vividness). The
experimental design of the current study produced repeated measures data. For example, 36
repeated measures were made for startle magnitude within an individual. These repeated
measures data are hierarchical (or nested). In other words, measurement occasions are nested
within individuals. For the current study, 9 repeated measures were nested within a script
category, and therefore 36 repeated measures of startle magnitude were nested within an
individual. The same logic was applied to other repeated measures in the current study. For
repeated measures data analysis, advantages of multi-level modeling (MLM) over conventional
analytic methods such as ANOVA or MANOVA are well documented (e.g., Quene & Bergh,
2004); one such advantage of MLM is that it is capable of statistical analysis of incomplete or
unbalanced data (i.e., dataset with missing data (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). In
psychophysiological research often utilizing repeated measures designs, MLM has been recently
discussed as an alternative data analysis approach (e.g., Kristjansson, Kircher, & Webb, 2007).
In order to evaluate the effects of emotional conditions on startle magnitude, planned
contrasts were performed: a) shame vs. neutral (1, -1, 0, 0), b) neutral vs. guilt (0, 1, -1, 0), and c)
guilt vs. positive (0, 0, 1, -1). One contrast was used to test a hypothesis about differences in
heart rate and skin conductance among emotional conditions: shame, guilt, and positive vs.
neutral (1/3, -1, 1/3, 1/3). In order to evaluate the effects of emotional conditions on affective
experience, two contrasts were used: a) shame (shame vs. guilt, neutral, and positive) (1, -1/3, 1/3, -1/3) and b) guilt (guilt vs. shame, neutral, and positive) (-1/3, -1/3, 1, -1/3). In order to
examine the effects of emotional conditions on valence and arousal, two contrasts were used: a)
valence (shame and guilt vs. neutral and positive) (-1, 1, -1, 1) and b) arousal (shame, guilt, and
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positive vs. neutral) (1/3, -1, 1/3, 1/3). All statistical tests used an alpha level of .05 for statistical
significance. In order to examine the effects of emotional conditions on vividness of imagery, the
Bonferroni correction was used to control family-wise error rate when contrasting the mean
value across emotional conditions.
Statistical analysis was performed using SPSS (v. 20, SPSS Inc, Chicago, IL). Mixed
Models - Linear of SPSS was used for MLM. Full maximum likelihood method was used to
estimate missing data. Repeated measures nested within an individual are correlated with each
other. To address these dependent errors among repeated measures of physiological data (i.e.,
startle response, heart rate, and skin conductance), an autoregressive covariance structure was
used. Psychophysiological research with repeated measures of startle magnitude, heart rate and
skin conductance has reported the habituation effect (i.e., magnitude of physiological reactivity
tends to decrease over trials) (e.g., Bradley, Lang, & Cuthbert, 1993). Pearson correlation
coefficients of the current study replicated the habituation effect; correlation coefficients among
trial and three physiological measures ranged from r (1574) = -0.083 to r (2119) = -0.168, and
they were statistically significant at alpha level of .01. That is, two measurements right next to
each other tend to show a higher correlation compared to two measurements farther apart from
each other. For repeated measures of self-report data (i.e., valence, arousal, vividness, shame and
guilt) obtained from second imagery task, unstructured covariance structure was used. Scripts
were randomly ordered for each participant so that no systemic relationship (e.g., correlation)
was deemed to be observed among measure of each variable. Pearson correlation coefficients
between trials and these variables largely confirmed this prediction in that no significant
correlation was found between trials and the variables, except vividness (r (790) = 0.098, p <
.01). For valence and guilt, convergence was not achieved with unstructured covariance
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structure, and therefore autoregressive covariance structure was used instead. Results remained
the same with compound symmetry covariance structure.
Results
Physiological Reactivity Data
Startle response magnitude (SRM). MLM results examining the effect of script conditions
on SRM are shown in Table 3. A preplanned contrast (1, -1, 0, 0) examining any significant
difference in SRM between shame and neutral script conditions confirmed that startles elicited
during shame scripts were significantly larger than ones elicited during neutral scripts, t
(154.988) = 4.469, p < .001. Another preplanned contrast (0, 1, -1, 0) examining difference
between neutral and guilt script conditions revealed that startles elicited during guilt scripts were
significantly larger than ones elicited during neutral scripts, t (152.544) = -3.413, p < .01, which
was contrary to the prediction. The last contrast (0, 0, 1, -1) examining difference between guilt
and positive script conditions supported the prediction that startles elicited during guilt scripts
was significantly larger than ones elicited during positive scripts, t (150.233) = 3.750, p < .01.
There was no significant difference in SRM between shame and guilt script conditions, t
(139.570) = 1.134, p = .259. SRM difference between neutral and positive script conditions was
not statistically significant, t (154.674) = 0.364, p = .716.
Heart rate change (HRC). MLM results examining the effect of script conditions on HRC
are shown in Table 4.A preplanned contrast (1/3, -1, 1/3, 1/3) revealed that HRC of shame, guilt
and positive script conditions was significantly larger than neutral script condition’s, t (142.773)
= 5.415, p < .001. Post-hoc comparison revealed that there was no significant difference in HRC
among shame, guilt and positive script conditions.
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Skin conductance response (SCR). MLM results examining the effect of script conditions
on SCR are shown in Table 5. A preplanned contrast (1/3, -1, 1/3, 1/3) revealed that SCR of
shame, guilt and positive script conditions was significantly larger than neutral script condition’s,
t (158.064) = 4.299, p < .001. Post-hoc comparison revealed that there was no significant
difference in SCR among shame, guilt and positive script conditions.
Self-Report Data
Data obtained from the second imagery task. MLM results examining the effect of script
conditions on valence are shown in Table 6. A preplanned contrast (1, -1, 1, -1) revealed that
both neutral and positive scripts were rated as more pleasant as compared to shame and guilt
scripts, t (278.628) = - 63.999, p < .001. Another preplanned contrast (1, 0, -1, 0) revealed that
shame script was rated as more unpleasant than guilt script, t (282.072) = -2.485, p = .014.
Valence rating between neutral and positive script conditions was not statistically significant, t
(274.238) = -0.017, p = 0.987. For arousal (see Table 7), a preplanned contrast (1/3, -1, 1/3, 1/3)
supported the hypothesis that the neutral script was rated less arousing compared to the three
other script conditions, t (152.711) = 11.124 p < .001. No significant difference between shame
and guilt script conditions emerged, t (154.170) = 0.709, p = 0.479. Post-hoc comparisons with
Bonferroni correction revealed that positive script was rated more arousing than guilt script
condition, t (158.016) = -2.919, p = 0.02. No significant difference between shame and positive
script conditions was obtained, t (155.318) = -2.206, p = .173. For vividness (see Table 8),
univariate test indicated that there were significant differences in vividness ratings among 4
script conditions, F (3, 134.038) = 17.254, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons with Bonferroni
correction indicated that neutral scripts were rated more vivid than shame, t (126.781) = -6.214,
p < .001, and guilt, t (140.810) = -5.705, p < .001, scripts and that positive script was also rated
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more vivid than shame, t (135.304) = -3.617, p = 0.003, and guilt, t (130.598) = -3.132, p =
0.013, scripts. Significant differences were not obtained for either the shame and guilt script
comparison or the neutral and positive script comparison. The main effect of script condition on
SRM remained the same (i.e., shame, guilt > neutral, positive) even after covarying out the
vividness of scripts.
For shame (see Table 9), a preplanned contrast (1, -1/3, -1/3, -1/3) supported the
hypothesis that participants reported more intense shame feeling in the shame script condition as
compared to other three script conditions, t (125.409) = 13.534, p < .001. Post-hoc comparison
indicated that guilt script condition produced more intense shame feeling as compared to neutral,
t (154.850) = 12.602, p < .001, and positive, t (113.902) = 6.794, p < .001, script conditions.
Interestingly, self-reported shame feeling was more intense in the positive script condition than
neutral script condition, t (133.262) = -6.217, p < .001. For guilt (see Table 10), a preplanned
contrast (-1/3, -1/3, 1, -1/3) found that participants reported more intense guilt feeling in the guilt
script condition as compared to other three script conditions, t (190.436) = 17.755, p < .001.
Post-hoc comparison indicated that shame script condition produced more intense guilt feeling as
compared to neutral, t (233.925) = 15.519, p < .001, and positive, t (239.986) = 14.612, p < .001,
script conditions.
Paper-and-pencil questionnaires data. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation
coefficients for all variables obtained from paper-and-pencil questionnaires (i.e., CES-D, BAS,
BIS, TOSCA-Shame, TOSCA-Guilt) are presented in Table 11. Largely replicating findings of
previous studies (e.g., Johnson, Turner, & Iwata, 2003; Kasch, Rottenberg, Arnow, & Gotlib,
2002; Tangney et al., 1992), BIS was significantly and positively correlated with CES-D, and
there was a significant positive correlation between shame and guilt of TOSCA. In addition,
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shame of TOSCA was significantly and positively correlated with CES-D. Of note, shame of
TOSCA was significantly and positively correlated with BIS (r = 0.53, p < .01). However, no
significant correlation between guilt of TOSCA and BAS emerged (r = 0.02, p > .05).
Supplementary Data Analysis: Explaining Variance in Physiological Data with Self-Reported
Data
Primary research hypotheses of the current study were to investigate the main effect of
script conditions on startle response magnitude (SRM). Data analysis results partially supported
the hypotheses in that SRM of shame script condition was larger than neutral script’s and that
SRM of guilt script condition was larger than positive script’s. However, data analysis results
revealed no significant differences in SRM between shame and guilt script conditions and
between neutral and positive script conditions. Moreover, contrary to prediction, SRM of guilt
script condition was larger than neutral script’s. With respect to SRM, shame and guilt appeared
to cluster in one category with neutral and positive in another category. Moreover, with respect
to self-reported valence and guilt of second imagery session, shame and guilt appeared to cluster
in one category (i.e., unpleasant and intense guilt-provoking) with neutral and positive in another
category (i.e., pleasant and moderate guilt-provoking). Thus, additional MLM was conducted to
investigate whether valence and guilt significantly explained the variance of SRM (see Table
12). Results showed that valence (t (1083.256) = -2.358, p < .05) and guilt (t (1043.800) = 2.254,
p < .05) were statistically significant predictors of SRM. A script rated as more pleasant
produced smaller SRM, whereas a script rated as more guilt-inducing produced larger SRM.
None of between-individual variables (i.e., CES-D, BAS, BIS, TOSCA-Shame, TOSCA-Guilt)
was a statistically significant predictor of SRM (see Table 13). No significant interaction effect
between script condition and these between-individual variables emerged.
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Discussion
Valence and arousal have been discussed as informative dimensions of emotion (e.g.,
Russell, 1979; Schlosberg, 1954). Affective science has confirmed that shame and guilt share the
similarities in terms of valence and arousal in that shame and guilt are perceived as unpleasant
and arousing emotions (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman et al., 1994). These similarities were
replicated in the current study as well in that both shame and guilt emotional scripts were rated
as unpleasant and arousing. However, shame script was rated as more unpleasant than guilt. In
addition, physiological indices (i.e., cardiovascular reactivity and skin conductance response)
corresponding to arousal level also supported the similar characteristic shared by shame and guilt
in that no significant differences emerged in heart rate change and skin conductance response
between shame and guilt script conditions.
Despite these similarities, discrete aspects of shame and guilt have been explored, largely
inspired by Lewis’s theoretical framework and Gilbert’s evolutionary biopsychology. Among
others, discrete motivational directions (i.e., withdrawal-related shame vs. approach-related guilt)
were informed by the above theoretical frameworks as well as supportive empirical studies
(Linsday-Hartz, 1984; Tangney et al., 1996; Wicker et al., 1983). However, a noteworthy
limitation of existing empirical research exploring the discrete aspects of shame and guilt is that
self-report data have been a primary source of investigation. To address this limitation, the
current study incorporated a number of physiological measures in addition to self-report data to
investigate the motivational underpinnings of shame and guilt. Informed by Lang’s startle reflex
paradigm (see Lang, 1995 for a review), the current study examined whether startle response
magnitude can differentiate shame from guilt. For this purpose, participants engaged in imagery
tasks in which they imagined emotionally laden scripts. It was hypothesized that startle response
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magnitude would be larger while participants were imagining shame-activating scripts as
compared to guilt-activating ones.
Startle reflex data in the current study supported a proposition that withdrawal-related
shame is associated with potentiated startle response magnitude. More specifically, the startle
magnitude of the shame script condition was significantly larger than the startle magnitude of
neutral and positive script conditions. However, the startle magnitude response data did not
support the hypothesis that the shame script condition would produce a larger startle response
magnitude than the guilt script condition. Even though self-report data indicated that the shame
and guilt scripts elicited the intended emotions, startle response magnitude was not significantly
different between shame and guilt script conditions. In addition, contrary to prediction, startle
response magnitude in the guilt script condition was significantly larger than in the neutral script
condition. Furthermore, no significant startle response magnitude difference emerged between
neutral and positive script conditions. Therefore, startle response magnitude data suggested that
four different emotional script conditions might be organized into two categories: shame and
guilt as one and neutral and positive as the other.
The finding that there was no significant difference in startle response magnitude
between shame and guilt might be because of “emotional blending” of shame and guilt in both
shame and guilt script conditions. An inspection on affective ratings revealed that shame scripts
successfully induced a target feeling (i.e., shame) in that, as hypothesized, participants reported
more intense shame feelings in the shame script condition as compared to the other three script
conditions. Likewise, participants reported more intense guilt feelings in the guilt script
condition as compared to the other three script conditions. However, it also was observed that
participants reported relatively intense guilt feeling in the shame script and shame feelings in the
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guilt script. These findings suggest that the simultaneous experience of both shame and guilt
(i.e., high degree of “blending”) may explain the lack of a significant difference found between
startle response magnitudes for the two script conditions. In other words, the effect of
withdrawal-related shame on startle reflex potentiation might have been countervailed by
participants simultaneously experiencing approach-related guilt; whereas the effect of approachrelated guilt on startle reflex attenuation might have been countervailed by participants
simultaneously experiencing withdrawal-related shame. In contrast, neutral and positive scripts
could have activated approach-related pleasant feelings for which startle response magnitudes of
these scripts conditions were significantly smaller than ones obtained from both shame and guilt
conditions.
It can be further speculated that compared to neutral and positive scripts, shame and guilt
scripts used in the current study were inherently more difficult to imagine. Thus, participants
might have focused their imagery on unpleasant antecedent feelings instead of action (i.e.,
approach or withdrawal). For example, in two out of three guilt scripts, reparation action (i.e.,
approach) was probably difficult to be successfully implemented even in mental imagery. The
laboratory situation where participants were sitting still in a chair could have inhibited this
approach motivational response. Of note, in the absence of activation of motivational direction,
anger was not associated with increased left frontal cortical activity, an index of approach
motivation (Harmon-Jones et al., 2003).
Upon incorporating self-report data obtained during the second imagery task into startle
magnitude data, it became discernible that valence plays a key role in determining startle
response magnitude. Valence data indicated that participants perceived shame and guilt scripts as
highly unpleasant and neutral and positive scripts were equally pleasant. In addition, regressing

32
self-reported affective data onto startle response magnitude, it was found that valence predicted
the startle magnitude in that the more pleasant a script was perceived, the smaller the startle
response magnitude was. This finding that valence modulates startle magnitude is consistent with
previous empirical studies (e.g., Bradley et al., 1993). The current study’s result that startle
response magnitude was not significantly different a) between shame and guilt script conditions
and b) between neutral and positive script conditions could, then, be attributed to the fact that a)
shame and guilt scripts were perceived as highly unpleasant, and b) neutral scripts of the current
study were perceived as equally pleasant as positive scripts. Even though shame script was rated
as more unpleasant than guilt script, this observed hedonic valence difference might not have
been large enough to bring about any significant difference in startle response magnitude
between shame and guilt script conditions.
Startle hypotheses proposed in the current study were primarily informed by the view that
startle magnitude is an index of motivational direction. The stimuli (regardless of their valence)
activating approach system are theorized to produce attenuated startle response, whereas stimuli
activating withdrawal system are theorized to produce potentiated startle response (Lang, 1995).
This posits that motivational direction, not hedonic valence of stimuli, is a key determinant of
startle response magnitude. However, the majority of previous empirical studies appear to
inadequately examine this proposition because hedonic valence was often confounded with
motivational direction. A linear pattern of startle magnitude as a function of valence (i.e.,
unpleasant > neutral > pleasant) has been repeatedly reported (e.g., Bradley et al., 1993; Vrana et
al., 1988; see Lang et al., 1990 for a review). This linear pattern has been presented as supporting
evidence that startle reflex taps into motivational direction of stimuli. One underlying
assumption, though, is that hedonic valence is a proxy for motivational direction. In view of
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some evidence (see Lang, 1995 for a review) suggesting that startle reflex reflects approach
versus avoidance motivation and that hedonic valence may be a marker of approach versus
avoidance, hedonic valence of stimuli might be a key determinant for startle reflex. The finding
of the current study that valence emerged as a significant predictor of startle response magnitude
appeared to be consistent with this speculation. In addition, in the current study state guilt
measured during the second imagery session was found to be a significant predictor of startle
response magnitude. That is, a script rated as more intensely guilt-inducing produced larger
startle response magnitude. The association of state guilt with potentiated startle response
magnitude also could be understood in the same context; namely, guilt, as an unpleasant
affective state, could induce a potentiated startle reflex. However, TOSCA-Guilt did not emerge
as significant predictor of startle response magnitude in the current study. These findings could
be understood by the fact that self-report data, behavioral data and physiological data are often
not correlating with each other (Lang, 1977). “Under most conditions of affective stimulation,
responding systems appear to be only loosely coupled.” (Lang, Levin, Miller, & Kozak, 1983, p.
277).
In the current study, self-reported shame was not a significant predictor of startle
response magnitude. One unanticipated result of the current study was that participants endorsed
relatively high shame scores for positive scripts. Self-reported shame scores for positive scripts
were significantly higher as compared to neutral scripts. A close investigation on participants’
ratings of PFQ-2 revealed that participants endorsed several shame-related items such as
“feelings of blushing” and “feeling laughable” after they imagined positive scripts. Participants’
endorsement on these items could reflect arousing aspects of positive scripts. Self-reported
shame scores would be associated with potentiated startle reflex in both shame and guilt script
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conditions, whereas self-reported shame scores would be associated with attenuated startle reflex
in the positive script condition. Consequently, the effect of self-reported shame score on startle
response magnitude could have been countervailed, and this may be one reason why the selfreport of shame did not emerge as a significant predictor of startle response magnitude in the
current study.
The amygdala has been proposed as a key modulator of startle reflex (e.g., Angrilli et al.,
1996; Hitchcock & Davis, 1991). It may be then speculated that the amygdala processes
incoming stimuli largely based upon their hedonic valence resulting in potentiated startle reflex
for unpleasant stimuli but attenuated startle reflex for pleasant stimuli. Motivational direction of
stimuli might be determined by more complex/high functioning brain structures such as the
prefrontal cortex, which could be detected by EEG measures. Interestingly, data obtained from
pencil-and-paper questionnaires of the current study indicated a positive correlation between
shame measured by TOSCA-3 and avoidance tendency measured by BIS. Even though no causeand-effect relationship can be confirmed by this correlational data, the positive correlation
between shame and avoidance tendency certainly warrants a further investigation about
withdrawal-related shame. In addition to hedonic valence, items on the TOSCA-3 and BIS tap
into cognitive processes and behavioral engagement, and these variables may be more subject to
more complex/high functioning brain structures. Startle reflex, modulated by the amygdala, may
not have sufficiently detected these processes, therefore, failing to differentiate shame from guilt.
Regarding approach-related guilt, though, no significant positive correlation was found between
guilt measured by TOSCA-3 and approach tendency measured by BAS. This suggests that shame
could be differentiated from guilt in terms of magnitude of withdrawal motivation.
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Consistent with psychophysiological research, cardiovascular reactivity and skin
conductance successfully differentiated highly arousing stimuli from less arousing stimuli. As
hypothesized, shame, guilt and positive scripts were rated more arousing than neutral script.
Likewise, the former three scripts yielded larger heart rate change and skin conductance response
as compared to neutral script. Furthermore, regressing self-reported data (i.e., valence, arousal,
shame, guilt and vividness) on heart rate change and skin conductance response, arousal was a
significant predictor for both variables. Scripts rated more arousing yielded larger heart rate and
skin conductance. These findings are consistent with psychophysiological research reporting
positive linear relationships of self-reported arousal with these two physiological variables (e.g.,
Cook et al., 1988; McNeil et al., 1993; Vrana & Lang, 1990). Additionally, a significant negative
linear relationship between PFQ-2 guilt and heart rate change was found. This negative linear
relationship indicates that scripts rated as less guilt-inducing yield larger heart rate change.
Positive scripts elicited very little guilt and significant heart rate reactivity, and this pattern of
findings could be underlying the overall relationship between guilt score and heart rate change
among the four emotional script conditions.
Limitations and Future Directions
“Emotional blending” of shame and guilt observed in the current study was discussed as a
plausible explanation for the nonsignificant difference in startle response magnitude between
shame and guilt conditions. In fact, the tendency to simultaneously experience shame and guilt
has been widely documented (e.g., Hooge et al., 2007). Shame and guilt scripts selections were
informed by another independent study conducted in our laboratory. However, as Table 1
indicated, the majority of scenarios selected as either shame or guilt scripts for the current study
are indeed deemed to elicit these two emotions simultaneously, which might have contributed to
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“emotional blending.” To address this issue and minimize the degree of “emotional blending,”
shame and guilt scripts used in the current study explicitly referenced shame- or guilt-relevant
responses in reaction to hypothetical situations. However, this approach may have been
unsatisfactory. Individualized/personalized emotional scripts instead of standardized ones may
provide a more accurate/specific approach to minimize the degree of “emotional blending.”
Personalized emotional scripts can also better assist participants in more actively engaging in
imagery tasks. To develop individualized scripts, a structured interview to elicit detailed
information from participants about their own personal experience of shame and guilt is worth
considering. In addition, between-groups design instead of within-group one of this study is
worth considering as a means of minimizing “emotional blending.” That is, with a betweengroups design, participants are assigned to imagine only a guilt script or only a shame script
within an imagery block to prevent carry-over effects.
A high degree of “blending” of shame and guilt observed in the current study’s results
from the PFQ-2 may relate to this measures construction. One disadvantage of PFQ-2 is that due
to lack of clear understanding of differences between shame and guilt, respondents tend to
endorse both guilt and shame adjectives to report either guilt or shame feelings (Tangney, 1996).
For example, respondents are more likely to endorse a guilt item (“mild guilt”) to reflect their
shame experience. Guilt is often used as a generic term for both shame and guilt. Therefore, the
use of the PFQ-2 can result in the high degree of “blending” of shame and guilt. Scales without
the term “guilt” such as State Shame and Guilt Scale (SSGS) (Marschall, Sanftner, & Tangney,
1994) may help to decrease the “blending” of shame and guilt. SSGS does not include items such
as “feelings of blushing” and “feeling laughable” that participants would be more likely to
endorse to reflect highly arousing positive affect as observed in the current study. Even if a
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future study finds that startle response magnitude in the shame condition is larger than in the
guilt condition, a firm conclusion may not be drawn with the high degree of “blending” of shame
and guilt obtained associated with self-report.
The findings of the current study invite more vigorous empirical studies examining the
role of motivational direction on startle reflex modulation. As discussed above, valence instead
of motivational direction might play a key role in startle magnitude modification. Valence has
been confounded with motivational direction in a number of startle reflex studies (Bradley et al.,
1993; Vrana et al., 1988), thereby clouding the interpretation of the degree to which startle reflex
is modulated by motivational direction. Direct empirical tests addressing the confound effect of
valence and motivational direction would help determine whether startle response modulation is
subject to motivational direction or hedonic valence of stimuli. A direct manipulation of
motivational direction without a hedonic valence confound is a necessary step to better
determine whether startle reflex is modulated by motivational direction. To the author’s
knowledge, only one empirical study (i.e., Thibodeau, 2011) directly manipulated motivational
direction without an hedonic valence confound in which arm extension deemed to activate
withdrawal motivation elicited larger startle response than arm flexion deemed to activate
approach motivation. These findings support the view that startle reflex is modulated by
motivational direction independent of hedonic valence because a non-significant difference in
hedonic valence emerged between the two arm positions.
Another simple strategy that could directly manipulate motivational direction
independent of hedonic valence is hand contractions (Harmon-Jones, 2006). Contractions of the
right hand are deemed to induce approach, whereas contractions of the left hand are deemed to
activate withdrawal. If startle response magnitude is significantly different between these two
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contractions conditions (i.e., contractions of the left hand > contractions of the right hand), this
finding may offer supporting evidence that startle response is modulated as a function of
motivational direction. In addition, future study would benefit from the inclusion of measures
such as EEG tapping into more complicated/high functioning brain structures. The findings of
startle reflex can be then compared to EEG data. This comparison can further clarify the
mechanisms for the motivational basis of startle reflex.
Summary and conclusion
Consistent with hypotheses, startle response magnitude in the shame script condition was
significantly larger than neutral and positive script conditions. However, there were no
significant differences in startle magnitude between shame and guilt script conditions or between
neutral and positive script conditions. Valence of script was emerged as a significant predictor of
startle response magnitude such that more pleasant scripts produced smaller startle magnitude.
With respect to startle response magnitude and valence of script, shame and guilt appeared to
cluster in one category with neutral and positive in another category. This finding invites more
scientifically rigorous investigation of whether startle response is modulated by motivation
direction or hedonic valence of foreground stimuli.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of TOSCA-3 Negative Scenarios

Shame

TOSCA-3 scenarios

Item
1
2
4*
5
7**
9
10**
12
13**
15*
16

Mean
4.03
1.36
3.54
2.15
1.88
3.20
3.29
2.15
3.15
3.74
2.92

*: shame scripts selected for the current study
**: guilt scripts selected for the current study

Guilt
SD
1.00
0.68
1.18
1.09
1.08
1.39
1.33
1.17
1.33
1.27
1.30

Mean
4.70
3.95
3.11
4.06
4.82
4.11
4.41
3.50
4.25
4.31
4.19

SD
0.55
1.01
1.24
0.96
0.55
1.06
0.84
1.17
0.79
0.93
1.04
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Table 2
Six Orders of Emotional Pairing utilized in the current study

Block 1

Block 2

Block 3

Block 4

Block 5

Block 6

1

SG

NP

SG

NP

SG

NP

2

SN

GP

SN

GP

SN

GP

3

SP

GN

SP

GN

SP

GN

4

GN

SP

GN

SP

GN

SP

5

GP

SN

GP

SN

GP

SN

6

NP

SG

NP

SG

NP

SG

Note. S = Shame, G = Guilt, N = Neutral, P = Positive
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Table 3
Multilevel Models Testing the Effect of Script Emotion Condition on Startle Response Magnitude
Startle response magnitude

Fixed effect
Shame
Neutral
Guilt
Positive
Overall script condition difference
Shame vs. Neutral
Guilt vs. Neutral
Guilt vs. Positive
Shame vs. Guilt
Neutral vs. Positive
Random effect
Individual variance
Note. N = 51.
** p < .01. *** p < .001.

Estimate

SE

12.484
10.582
12.017
10.427

1.298
1.301
1.299
1.301

(F (3, 148.925) = 11.863***)
1.901
0.425
1.434
0.420
1.590
0.424
0.467
0.412
0.156
0.427

80.494

16.375

t

95% CI

Wald Z (p)

9.883 - 15.085
7.976 - 13.189
9.414 - 14.620
7.820 - 13.033

4.469***
3.413**
3.750***
1.134
0.364

4.916***
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Table 4
Multilevel Models Testing the Effect of Script Emotion Condition on Heart Rate Change
Heart rate change

Fixed effect
Shame
Neutral
Guilt
Positive
Overall script condition difference
Shame, Guilt, Positive vs. Neutral
Shame vs. Guilta
Shame vs. Positivea
Guilt vs. Positivea
Random effect
Individual variance

Estimate

SE

1.157
0.108
1.237
1.348

0.277
0.278
0.279
0.276

(F (3, 138.913) = 10.033***)
1.140
0.210
-0.080
0.257
-0.191
0.251
-0.110
0.257

1.916

Note. N = 51. a Bonferroni correction was applied for significance test.
*** p < .001.

0.532

t

95% CI

Wald Z (p)

0.608 – 1.706
-0.444 – 0.660
0.685 – 1.790
0.800 – 1.896

5.415***
-0.313
-0.761
-0.429

3.599***

43
Table 5
Multilevel Models Testing the Effect of Script Emotion Condition on Skin Conductance Response
Skin conductance response

Fixed effect
Shame
Neutral
Guilt
Positive
Overall script condition difference
Shame, Guilt, Positive vs. Neutral
Shame vs. Guilta
Shame vs. Positivea
Guilt vs. Positivea
Random effect
Individual variance

Estimate

SE

0.224
0.130
0.222
0.235

0.020
0.020
0.020
0.020

(F (3, 157.470) = 6.355***)
0.096
0.022
0.001
0.027
-0.017
0.027
-0.018
0.027

0.013

Note. N = 48. a Bonferroni correction was applied for significance test.
*** p < .001.

0.002

t

95% CI

Wald Z

0.183 - 0.264
0.090 - 0.171
0.181 - 0.262
0.195 - 0.276

4.299***
0.049
-0.629
-0.675

6.802***
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Table 6
Multilevel Models Testing the Effect of Script Emotion Condition on Valence Rating
Valence a

Fixed effect
Shame
Neutral
Guilt
Positive
Overall script condition difference
Shame, Guilt vs. Neutral, Positive
Shame vs. Guilt
Neutral vs. Positive
Random effect
Individual variance

Estimate

SE

1.933
7.899
2.254
7.901

0.090
0.089
0.090
0.089

(F (3, 278.235) = 1367.542***)
-5.806
0.090
-0.321
0.129
-0.002
0.127

0.279

Note. N = 68. a higher value corresponds to more pleasant.
* p < .05. *** p < .001

0.050

t

95% CI

Wald Z (p)

1.755, 2.111
7.723, 8.074
2.076, 2.432
7.725, 8.076

-63.999***
-2.485*
-0.017

5.595***
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Table 7
Multilevel Models Testing the Effect of Script Emotion Condition on Arousal Rating
Arousala

Fixed effect
Shame
Neutral
Guilt
Positive
Overall script condition difference
Shame, Guilt, Positive vs. Neutral
Shame vs. Guilt
Shame vs. Positiveb
Guilt vs. Positiveb
Random effect
Individual variance

Estimate

SE

6.053
4.028
5.884
6.579

0.178
0.179
0.178
0.177

(F (3, 154.623) = 44.591***)
2.144
0.193
0.169
0.239
-0.526
0.238
-0.695
0.238

1.155

t

95% CI

5.702, 6.405
3.675, 4.382
5.532, 6.235
6.230, 6.928

11.124***
0.709
-2.206
-2.919*

0.224

Note. N = 67. a Higher value corresponds to higher arousal. b Bonferroni correction was applied for significance test.
* p < .05. *** p < .001.

Wald Z (p)

5.165***
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Table 8
Multilevel Models Testing the Effect of Script Emotion Condition on Vividness Rating
Vividnessa

Fixed effect
Shame
Neutral
Guilt
Positive
Overall script condition difference
Shame vs. Neutralb
Shame vs. Positiveb
Guilt vs. Neutralb
Guilt vs. Positiveb
Neutral vs. Positiveb
Shame vs. Guiltb
Random effect
Individual variance

Estimate

SE

7.048
7.806
7.110
7.492

0.110
0.110
0.112
0.110

(F (3, 134.038) = 17.254***)
-0.758
0.122
-0.444
0.123
-0.696
0.122
-0.382
0.122
0.314
0.120
-0.062
0.127

0.129

t

95% CI

6.831, 7.266
7.588, 8.024
6.890, 7.330
7.276, 7.709

-6.214***
-3.617**
-5.705***
-3.132*
2.615
-0.488

0.071

Note. N = 68. a Higher value corresponds to higher vividness. b Bonferroni correction was applied for significance test.
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.

Wald Z (p)

1.816
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Table 9
Multilevel Models Testing the Effect of Script Emotion Condition on Shame Rating
Shamea

Fixed effect
Shame
Neutral
Guilt
Positive
Overall script condition difference
Shame vs. Guilt, Neutral, Positive
Guilt vs. Neutralb
Guilt vs. Positiveb
Neutral vs. Positiveb
Random effect
Individual variance

Estimate

SE

16.393
3.737
13.166
8.318

0.764
0.785
0.768
0.766

(F (3, 128.468) = 111.783***)
7.986
0.590
9.429
0.748
4.848
0.714
-4.581
0.737

11.750

t

95% CI

14.881, 17.906
2.186, 5.289
11.646, 14.686
6.803, 9.834

13.534***
12.602***
6.794***
-6.217***

2.429

Note. N = 68. a Higher value corresponds to more intense shame. b Bonferroni correction was applied for significance test.
*** p < .001.

Wald Z (p)

4.837***

48
Table 10
Multilevel Models Testing the Effect of Script Emotion Condition on Guilt Rating
Guilta

Fixed effect
Shame
Neutral
Guilt
Positive
Overall script condition difference
Guilt vs. Shame, Neutral, Positive
Shame vs. Neutralb
Shame vs. Positiveb
Neutral vs. Positiveb
Random effect
Individual variance

Estimate

SE

10.952
0.469
13.517
1.015

0.463
0.517
0.463
0.523

(F (3, 223.666) = 198.657***)
9.372
0.528
10.483
0.675
9.937
0.680
-0.546
0.715

6.292

t

95% CI
10.040 – 11.863
-0.548 – 1.486
12.604 – 14.430
-0.013 – 2.043

17.755***
15.519***
14.612***
-0.764

1.514

Note. N = 68. a Higher value corresponds to more intense guilt. b Bonferroni correction was applied for significance test.
*** p < .001.

Wald Z (p)

4.157***
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Table 11
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlation Coefficients for Pencil-and-Paper Questionnaire
Measures
Mean

SD

α

BAS

BIS

TS

TG

CES-D

15.485

10.292

0.899

-0.23

.28*

.39**

-0.13

BAS

42.53

5.959

0.680

-0.01

-0.15

0.02

BIS

20.735

3.371

0.657

.53**

0.21

TS

32.059

7.299

0.754

TG

45.265

4.583

0.660

.29*

Note. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies – Depression scale, BAS = Behavioral
Activation System, BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System, TS = Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3,
Shame, TG = Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3, Guilt.
* p < .05, ** p < .01.
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Table 12
Results of MLM to Test the Effects of Self-Reported Data of Second Imagery Session on Physiological Reactivity
Startle response magnitudea

Heart rate changea

Skin conductance responseb

Predictor

Coefficient

SE

tc

Coefficient

SE

tc

Coefficient

SE

tc

Valence

-0.229

0.097

-2.358*

-0.093

0.057

-1.741

0.001

0.003

0.470

Arousal

0.014

0.111

0.124

0.131

0.054

2.292*

0.009

0.003

2.844**

Shame

-0.049

0.035

-1.433

0.004

0.017

0.243

0.001

0.001

0.990

Guilt

0.086

0.038

2.254*

-0.061

0.022

-2.760**

-0.0001

0.001

-0.052

Vividness

0.051

0.139

0.366

-0.037

0.081

-0.452

-0.007

0.005

-1.492

Note. a N = 50. b N = 47. c The degree of freedom ranged from 1043.800 to 15312.778 across analyses.
* p < .05. ** p < .01.
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Table 13
Results of MLM to Test the Effects of Between-Individual Variables on SRM
Predictor

Coefficient

SE

df

t

CES-D

-0.046

0.148

49.032

-0.314

BAS

-0.159

0.243

48.963

-0.655

BIS

-0.513

0.501

49.052

-1.023

TS

-0.206

0.226

49.029

-0.911

TG

0.294

0.287

48.947

1.024

Note. N = 49. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies – Depression scale, BAS =
Behavioral Activation System, BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System, TS = Test of Self-Conscious
Affect-3, Shame, TG = Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3, Guilt.
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Appendix A
Emotional Scripts
Shame Scripts
One of my classes requires a 10-page essay that is a really high-stakes paper. It turns out really
badly, and I feel like I am stupid and incompetent.
One of my friends really loves a dog. One day, I take care of my friend’s dog while my friend is
on vacation, and the dog runs away. I think I am irresponsible and useless.
(for male participant) My girlfriend dumps me abruptly. I do not have any clue why. I soon
realize that she is seeing another man. I feel like I am an ugly and unattractive person.
(for female participant) My boyfriend dumps me abruptly. I do not have any clue why. I soon
realize that he is seeing another woman. I feel like I am an ugly and unattractive person
Guilt Scripts
I practice baseball with my friend on weekend. While playing around, I throw a ball and it hits
my friend in the face. I approach my friend and apologize hoping that my friend feels better.
I prepare for a midterm exam of a class. On the exam day, I walk out of an exam thinking I do
extremely well. However, I find out I do poorly. I feel regret thinking I should have studied
harder.
I prepare for an important project for my class as a team with my classmates. I am responsible
for putting everything together. However, I make a big mistake on the project, and my
classmates criticize me. I think I should have recognized the problem and done a better job.
Neutral Scripts
I am lying on the sand on a warm day, listening to children playing down the beach, their soft
voices mingling with the sound of the waves.
A wood fire dances in the hearth, I feel snug and warm in the cabin, reading the book on my lap,
enjoying a well-deserved rest.
A soft smile creeps over my face as I begin to eat my favorite flavor of ice cream while listening
to my favorite music on the stereo.
Positive Scripts
(for male participant) As I walk across campus I catch the eye of a beautiful woman from one of
my classes walking toward me; she smiles widely as she passes.
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Appendix A (cont’d)
(for female participant) As I walk across campus I catch the eye of a handsome man from one of
my classes walking toward me; he smiles widely as he passes.
My professor stands in front of the lecture hall and rehashes how disappointed he is reading our
papers, but before I know it he is reading my paper, the only A paper in the class.
(for male participant) As I walk out of class the woman I have been watching all semester stops
and asks if we can study for the exam together.
(for female participant) As I walk out of class the man I have been watching all semester stops
and asks if we can study for the exam together.

54
Appendix B
TOSCA-3
1. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At 5 o'clock, you realize you stood him up.
a) You would think: "I'm inconsiderate."
b) You would think: "Well, they'll understand."
c) You'd think you should make it up to him as soon
as possible.
d) You would think: "My boss distracted me just
before lunch."

1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely
1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely
1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely
1---2---3---4---5
not likely very likely

2. You break something at work and then hide it.
a) You would think: "This is making me anxious. I
need to either fix it or get someone else to."
b) You would think about quitting.

1---2---3---4---5

c) You would think: "A lot of things aren't made
very well these days."
d) You would think: "It was only an accident."

1---2---3---4---5

1---2---3---4---5

1---2---3---4---5

3. You are out with friends one evening, and you're feeling especially witty and
attractive. Your best friend's spouse seems to particularly enjoy you
company.
a) You would think: "I should have been aware of what
my best friend is feeling."
b) You would feel happy with your appearance and
personality.
c) You would feel pleased to have made such a good
impression.
d) You would think your best friend should pay
attention to his/her spouse.
e) You would probably avoid eye-contact for a long
time.

1---2---3---4---5
1---2---3---4---5
1---2---3---4---5
1---2---3---4---5
1---2---3---4---5

4. At work, you wait until the last minute to plan a project, and it turns out
badly.
a) You would feel incompetent.

1---2---3---4---5

b) You would think: "There are never enough hours

1---2---3---4---5
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Appendix B (cont’d)
in the day."
c) You would feel: "I deserve to be reprimanded for
mismanaging the project."
d) You would think: "What's done is done."

1---2---3---4---5
1---2---3---4---5

5. You make a mistake at work and find out a co-worker is blamed for the error.
a) You would think the company did not like the
co-worker.
b) You would think: "Life is not fair."

1---2---3---4---5
1---2---3---4---5

c) You would keep quiet and avoid the co-worker.

1---2---3---4---5

d) You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the
situation.

1---2---3---4---5

6. For several days you put off making a difficult phone call. At the last minute you make the
call and are able to manipulate the conversation so that all goes well.
a) You would think: "I guess I'm more persuasive than
I thought."
b) You would regret that you put it off.

1---2---3---4---5

c) You would feel like a coward.

1---2---3---4---5

d) You would think: "I did a good job."

1---2---3---4---5

e) You would think you shouldn't have to make calls
you feel pressured into.

1---2---3---4---5

1---2---3---4---5

7. While playing around, you throw a ball and it hits your friend in the face.
a) You would feel inadequate that you can't even
throw a ball.
b) You would think maybe your friend needs more
practice at catching.
c) You would think: "It was just an accident."
d) You would apologize and make sure your friend
feels better.

1---2---3---4---5
1---2---3---4---5
1---2---3---4---5
1---2---3---4---5

8. You have recently moved away from your family, and everyone has been very
helpful. A few times you needed to borrow money, but you paid it back as
soon as you could.
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a) You would feel immature.

1---2---3---4---5

b) You would think: "I sure ran into some bad luck."

1---2---3---4---5

c) You would return the favor as quickly as you could.

1---2---3---4---5

d) You would think: "I am a trustworthy person."

1---2---3---4---5

e) You would be proud that you repaid your debts.

1---2---3---4---5

9. You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal.
a) You would think the animal shouldn't have been
on the road.
b) You would think: "I'm terrible."

1---2---3---4---5
1---2---3---4---5

c) You would feel: "Well, it was an accident."

1---2---3---4---5

d) You'd feel bad you hadn't been more alert
driving down the road.

1---2---3---4---5

10. You walk out of an exam thinking you did extremely well. Then you find out
you did poorly.
a) You would think: "Well, it's just a test."

1---2---3---4---5

b) You would think: "The instructor doesn't like me."

1---2---3---4---5

c) You would think: "I should have studied harder."

1---2---3---4---5

d) You would feel stupid.

1---2---3---4---5

11. You and a group of co-workers worked very hard on a project. Your boss singles you out for
a bonus because the project was such a success.
a) You would feel the boss is rather short-sighted.

1---2---3---4---5

b) You would feel alone and apart from your
colleagues.
c) You would feel your hard work had paid off.

1---2---3---4---5

d) You would feel competent and proud of yourself.

1---2---3---4---5

1---2---3---4---5
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e) You would feel you should not accept it.

1---2---3---4---5

12. While out with a group of friends, you make fun of a friend who's not there.
a) You would think: "It was all in fun; it's harmless."

1---2---3---4---5

b) You would feel small...like a rat.

1---2---3---4---5

c) You would think that perhaps that friend should
have been there to defend himself/herself.
d) You would apologize and talk about that person's
good points.

1---2---3---4---5
1---2---3---4---5

13. You make a big mistake on an important project at work. People were depending on you,
and your boss criticizes you.
a) You would think your boss should have been more
clear about what was expected of you.
b) You would feel like you wanted to hide.

1---2---3---4---5

c) You would think: "I should have recognized the
problem and done a better job."
d) You would think: "Well, nobody's perfect."

1---2---3---4---5

1---2---3---4---5

1---2---3---4---5

14. You volunteer to help with the local Special Olympics for handicapped children. It turns out
to be frustrating and time-consuming work. You think seriously about quitting, but then you see
how happy the kids are.
a) You would feel selfish and you'd think you are
basically lazy.
b) You would feel you were forced into doing
something you did not want to do.
c) You would think: "I should be more concerned
about people who are less fortunate."
d) You would feel great that you had helped others.

1---2---3---4---5

e) You would feel very satisfied with yourself.

1---2---3---4---5

1---2---3---4---5
1---2---3---4---5
1---2---3---4---5

15. You are taking care of your friend's dog while they are on vacation and the
dog runs away.
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a) You would think, "I am irresponsible and
incompetent.”
b) You would think your friend must not take very
good care of their dog or it wouldn't have run away.
c) You would vow to be more careful next time.

1---2---3---4---5

d) You would think your friend could just get a
new dog.

1---2---3---4---5

1---2---3---4---5
1---2---3---4---5

16. You attend your co-worker's housewarming party and you spill red wine on their new creamcolored carpet, but you think no one notices.
a) You think your co-worker should have expected
some accidents at such a big party.
b) You would stay late to help clean up the stain
after the party.
c) You would wish you were anywhere but at
the party.
d) You would wonder why your co-worker chose to
serve red wine with the new light carpet.

1---2---3---4---5
1---2---3---4---5
1---2---3---4---5
1---2---3---4---5
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Post-Experimental Questionnaire
1.

How carefully would you say you followed the imagery instruction given in the study?
1

2

3

4

Not carefully at all

2.

2

3

4

9

Extremely carefully

5

6

7

8

Neutral

2

3

4

Extremely easy

9

Extremely difficult

5

6

7

8

Neutral

9

Extremely difficult

How carefully would you say you followed the relaxation instruction given in the study?
1

2

3

4

Not carefully at all

5

6

7

8

Neutral

9

Extremely carefully

How easy/difficult was it for you to follow the relaxation instruction given in the study?
1

2

3

4

Extremely easy

6.

8

How much effortful was it for you to vividly imagine the situations?
1

5.

7

Neutral

Extremely easy

4.

6

How easy/difficult was it for you to follow the imagery instruction given in the study?
1

3.

5

5

6

7

8

Neutral

9

Extremely difficult

How much effortful was it for you to relax during relaxation period?
1

2

Extremely easy

3

4

5
Neutral

6

7

8

9
Extremely difficult
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Imagery Rating
Please rate each question to indicate your experience while you were imaging the script ‘A’/’B’
1. The degree of pleasure/contentment/happiness you felt (1 = extreme displeasure, 5 =
neutral, 9 = extreme pleasure)
1

2

3

4

Extreme displeasure

5

6

7

8

Neutral

9
Extreme pleasure

2. The degree of arousal/provocation/stimulation you felt (1 = extreme calmness, 5 =
neutral, 9 = extreme arousal)
1

2

3

4

Extreme calmness

5

6

7

8

Neutral

9
Extreme arousal

3. The degree of vividness/clearness of imagery you created (1 = extreme unvividness, 5 =
neutral, 9 = extreme vividness)
1

2

Extreme unvividness

3

4

5
Neutral

6

7

8

9

Extreme vividness
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PFQ-2
Please indicate how much of each following emotion you felt while imagining the script. Use the
following scale to record your answers.
0

1

never

a little bit

Embarrassed (

3

moderately

)

Feeling ridiculous (

)

Self-Consciousness (
Intense guilt (
Regret (

2

Worry about hurting or injuring someone (

)

Feeling humiliated (

)

Feeling “stupid” (

)

Feeling “childish” (

)

Feelings of blushing (

)

Feeling laughable (

)

Remorse (

)

)

Feeling disgusting to others (

)

)

very strongly

)

)

Feeling deserve criticism for what you did (

strongly

Mild guilt (

)

Feeling helpless, paralyzed (

4

)
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CES-D
Using the scale below, indicate the number which best describes how often you felt or behaved
this way-DURING THE PAST WEEK.
1 = Rarely or none of the time (less than 1 day)
2 = Some or a little of the time (1-2 days)
3 = Occasionally or a moderate amount of time (3-4 days)
4 = Most or all of the time (5-7 days)
DURING THE PAST WEEK:
1. I was bothered by things
that usually don’t bother me.
2. I did not feel like eating; my
appetite was poor.
3. I felt that I could not shake off
the blues even with help from
my family or friends.
4. I felt that I was just as good
as other people.
5. I had trouble keeping my mind
on what I was doing.
6. I felt depressed.
7. I felt that everything I did was
an effort.
8. I felt hopeful about the future.
9. I thought my life had been a
failure.
10. I felt fearful.
11. My sleep was restless.
12. I was happy.
13. I talked less than usual.
14. I felt lonely.
15. People were unfriendly.
16. I enjoyed life.
17. I had crying spells.
18. I felt sad.
19. I felt that people disliked me.
20. I could not get “going.”

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
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BIS/BAS
Each item of this questionnaire is a statement that a person may either agree with or disagree
with. For each item, indicate how much you agree or disagree with what the item says. Please
respond to all the items; do not leave any blank. Choose only one response to each statement.
Please be as accurate and honest as you can be. Respond to each item as if it were the only item.
That is, don't worry about being "consistent" in your responses. Choose from the following four
response options:
1 = very true for me
2 = somewhat true for me
3 = somewhat false for me
4 = very false for me
1. A person's family is the most important thing in life. (
)
2. Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience fear or nervousness. (
3. I go out of my way to get things I want. (
)
4. When I'm doing well at something I love to keep at it. (
)
5. I'm always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun. (
)
6. How I dress is important to me. (
)
7. When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized. (
)
8. Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit. (
)
9. When I want something I usually go all-out to get it. (
)
10. I will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun. (
)
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

It's hard for me to find the time to do things such as get a haircut. (
)
If I see a chance to get something I want I move on it right away. (
)
I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry at me. (
)
When I see an opportunity for something I like I get excited right away. (
)
I often act on the spur of the moment. (
)
If I think something unpleasant is going to happen I usually get pretty "worked up." (
I often wonder why people act the way they do. (
)
When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly. (
)
I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something important. (
)
I crave excitement and new sensations. (
)

21.
22.
23.
24.

When I go after something I use a "no holds barred" approach. (
I have very few fears compared to my friends. (
)
It would excite me to win a contest. (
)
I worry about making mistakes. (
)

)

)

)
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Experimental Instruction
Thank you very much for your participation in today’s study. As you already know, the purpose
of this study is to understand people’s reactions to various situations encountered in life. There
are several parts to this study. First, I’ll ask you to imagine a series of situations while we record
various physiological reactions, such as your heart rate. Second, you will be asked to imagine the
situations one more time and you will complete some scales measuring how you feel when you
imagine the situations. Third, I’ll ask you to complete several questionnaires about different
psychological traits and attitudes. Finally, we’ll have a short discussion about the study and then
your participation will be complete. Before I go into more detail about the different parts of the
study, I’ll ask you to carefully read this informed consent form and sign at the bottom of the
second page if you agree to participate. Please alert me if you have any questions. (Participant
provides informed consent).
Now we’ll begin imagery session of the study. Previously, I mentioned that we’ll be recording
various physiological reactions while you imagine the situations. The first thing we will do is to
attach the sensors which will allow us to measure your physiological reactions. As I’m attaching
the sensors, I’ll explain what they measure and answer any questions you might have about the
physiological recording. (Experimenter prepares skin for attachment of electrodes and attaches
electrodes. During this time, all physiological measures [startle EMG, ECG, and skin
conductance] will be thoroughly explained.
Now that the sensors have been attached, I’ll explain the imagery session in more detail.
Throughout the experiment, you will imagine several situations in which people often experience
various emotions. When you imagine a situation, please actively imagine it as if it were really
happening. It is important that you vividly experience each situation. Do you have any question
so far? (Answer questions as indicated)
The whole imagery session consists of six sub-sections. At each section, you will imagine two
different situations for several times, and each situation will be paired with letter ‘A’ or ‘B’. You
will first read and create vivid imagery of each situation before we begin the imagery session. It
will help you actively imagine them during the imagery session.
When the imagery session begins after I leave this room, each letter will be presented on the
computer screen repeatedly. Immediately after you see a letter, please imagine an event
corresponding to each letter. While you imagine the event, a word ‘Relaxation’ will appear on
the computer monitor. Then, please stop imagining the scene and try to relax. Think the word
‘one’ when you exhale. It will help you relax and clear your mind. Then, at some point, a letter
will be shown on the computer screen. Then, please imagine an event corresponding to the letter.
In other words, the sequence will go imagery, relaxation, imagery, relaxation, and so on. It is
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important that your attention should always be directed toward the computer monitor. In a
minute, I will ask you to put on these headphones. You will occasionally hear some brief loud
noises through the headphones; these noises can be ignored.
When you complete a section, I will come back and give you another set of two situations that
are different from the first set. You will repeat the same procedure until you complete the whole
imagery session. Do you have any question so far? (Answer questions indicated)
Lastly, I’d like to say a few words about this camera that you read about in the informed consent
form. (Point to webcam) The camera will capture a video image of you seated in the chair and
feed it to the room next door, where I’ll be seated. The video feed is not recorded; we just use it
to make sure that everything is going smoothly with the experiment. Does this sound OK to you?
(Address concerns as needed)
OK. Here are the first two situations you will imagine (Hand in the scripts to participants). Please
first read each script and create vivid imagery of personally engaging in the events described.
Make sure which letter corresponds to which situation. Please let me know when you create
vivid imagery of each event. (Experimenter leaves room and comes back when participants are
ready)
Remember you will see a letter (either ‘A’ or ‘B’) on the computer monitor. Then, please
actively imagine a situation corresponding to each letter. Now I’m going to leave the room and
start imagery session. (Experimenter leaves room)
(Participants complete the first block of imagery session; experimenter returns to room)
OK. Here is the second set of situations you will imagine (Hand in the scripts to participants).
(Repeat the same procedure as before).
(Experimenter returns after first imagery session is completed) OK. The first imagery session
was just completed. Please answer these questions. I’d like to learn how the session was like for
you. (Hand the in manipulation check questionnaire)
(Upon the completion of the manipulation questionnaire) OK. I will now remove the sensors.
(Upon removal of the sensors) OK. You will imagine the situations one more time. We will use
powerpoint slide show for this part. Each script will be shown on the screen and stay about 4
seconds. Begin to create image of the script. And then a blank slide will appear. Please actively
imagine the situation until another slide appears. This slide will tell that you report your imagery
experience using these scales (show PFQ-2 and Imagery Rating scale). After you complete these
scales, please click the computer mouse to move to the next slide. You will then repeat the same
procedure until you imagine all 12 scripts. Any question? (Experimenter leaves the room)
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(Experimenter returns when the second imagery session is completed) OK. We will now move to
the last part of this study. I’ll ask you to fill out these questionnaires. As you’ll see, the
questionnaires ask about lots of different subjects related to psychological traits and attitudes.
Once again, please alert me if you have any questions.
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Debriefing Statement
First of all, thank you so much for your participation in the study. It is genuinely appreciated.
You were informed at the start of the session that this study aimed to understand people’s
reactions to various situations encountered in life. Now let me say more about this. Psychologists
have long been interested in discovering what happens inside the body during different
emotional states such as joy, shame, guilt, and so on. In this study, we measured several
physiological variables and tried to determine how they were affected by your imagining the
emotional situations. The sensors on your left hand were measuring changes in your sweat
response. These changes were very subtle; you probably didn’t feel yourself sweating during the
experiment. The sensors on your forearms were measuring your heart rhythm. The sensors
attached to your face were measuring activity in small muscles responsible for generating facial
expressions of emotion. Although our knowledge of bodily changes during the experience of
emotion has increased over the years, the emotion of shame and guilt continues to puzzle
psychologists. We’re still unsure about the pattern of physiological changes that occur when
people feel shame or guilt. Several situations you have imagined in this study have been shown
to make people feel guilt or shame. So, what we plan to do is analyze the physiological reactions
associated with feelings of shame and guilt. We also plan to examine whether your responses to
the questionnaires you filled out relate to your physiological reactions. Do you have any
questions about the study description that I just provided? (Answer questions as indicated)
Before you leave, I want to make absolutely certain that you’re not experiencing any undue
distress related to this experiment. People often express moderate level of distress due to their
feelings of shame and guilt. May we talk for a moment about how you’re feeling? (Address
concerns as indicated)
Do you have any questions about anything you have experienced today, the rationale for this
study or anything else? (Answer questions as indicated).
Once again, thank you so much for your participation. Have a great day.
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